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ONOURING Baloo, as the many teachers, students and friends of V. N.
Balasubramanyam fondly call him, is not difﬁcult. I have known him from
over 40 years ago, having encountered him ﬁrst and discovered his talents when
he became my Research Associate in India. Having interacted with him ever since
in a career marked by policy-related research accomplishment of the highest
order, I can truthfully claim that the gain from our friendship has been all
mine.
The best way for me to honour him is to address the issues which have been
most noteworthy in his research. These relate to the questions raised by multi-
nationals where he is one of the most inﬂuential scholars today. There is
virtually no international conference of any repute on multinationals where
Baloo has not been invited and makes a notable contribution. I have proﬁted from
his persuasive writings on the need for an Investment Code at the WTO. I have
also been delighted and educated by his demonstration (with his colleagues
Sapford and Salisu) of the validity of my hypotheses that (i) inward-looking
countries would ultimately attract lower foreign investment than outward-





In addition, his research has touched on most of the questions raised by the
foes and friends of multinationals; and one cannot write on the subject without




In writing this article, I have drawn on some of my earlier writings on multinationals and, in
particular, on my treatment of the subject in my recent book, 
 






See Balasubramanyam et al. (1996).
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about their allegedly baleful inﬂuence on the well-being of poor countries and
again of the poor among them.
 
2. CHARGE-SHEET AGAINST MULTINATIONALS
 
Critics tend to argue that multinationals must be condemned because they
bypass several countries such as those in Africa that need them, often accentuating
the ‘divide’ between those who are fortunate and those who are not. Then they also
complain inconsistently that multinationals cause harm where they go, exploiting
the ‘host’ countries and their workers.
The complaint about bypassing needy countries seems to be misplaced. If
multinationals bypass some poor countries, that is surely not surprising. They are
businesses that must survive by making a proﬁt. Indeed, no corporation ever
managed to do sustained good by making continuing losses. If a country wants
to attract investment, it obviously has to be an attractive locale. That generally
implies having political stability and economic advantages such as cheap labour
or exploitable natural resources. In the game of attracting investment, therefore,
some countries are simply going to lose because they lack these attributes.
For these unfortunate countries, the harsh reality is that no matter how good
their politics and policies are, they may not sufﬁce to attract multinationals. For
these countries, the only answer is to offset this private neglect by redirecting
public aid and technical assistance to them so that they get the funds and know-how
that will not come through the marketplace. The problem, of course, is that if
these countries lack the attributes necessary to attract multinationals, the likelihood
of their being able to absorb aid funds productively is also limited: a problem
that knee-jerk aid proponents today such as my colleague Jeffrey Sachs ignore to
the detriment of these countries themselves since aid wasted, or siphoned off into
corruption, will imperil their progress yet further.





to the poor countries. Ironically, the complaint of the early developmen economists





that there were no spillover effects, good or bad, for host countries. Their com-
plaint was then similar to that of the critics who bemoan the fact that multi-





host country. There was probably something, but almost never enough, to this
observation when the multinationals were in extractive industries. Today,
however, manufacturing, and increasingly ﬁnancial and other services, attract far
more investment. The debate therefore has become acute between those who
consider multinationals to be a malign inﬂuence and those who ﬁnd it to be a
benign force. As it happens, the evidence strongly suggests that the benign view
is more persuasive.
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Many observers of tax breaks to attract multinationals fear that there is a ‘race to the
bottom’ on tax concessions as poor countries compete among themselves to give such
generous terms to foreign investors that they wind up net losers. That, in fact, the race is
so ﬁerce that poor countries wind up net losers is doubtful. Even the concessions are from
taxes which must be paid and which provide a presumption that multinationals earn for
themselves less than what they contribute, the difference being the taxes paid. What one
can say with conﬁdence, however, is that the gains from inward investment by multina-
tionals are reduced by the competition, and the attendant tax breaks, to get the investment.
From the viewpoint of the multinationals, this competition for them is a
phenomenon that increases their share of the total economic gains ﬂowing from
investment in poor countries. Hence, it is not surprising that, while the multi-
nationals have long asked for voluntary Codes (for instance, at the OECD, where
a Code called the Multilateral Agreement on Investment was devised but ran into
fatal opposition from rich-country NGOs), even mandatory provisions (proposed,
by the European Union, for instance, at the WTO), to prevent the receiving countries
from imposing restrictions on the multinationals that come in, they have resolutely
opposed the imposition of any restrictions on tax breaks and subsidies to multi-
nationals. This is an indefensible position for anyone who is setting the rules of
the game for an efﬁcient allocation of world investments, since both restrictions
and artiﬁcial encouragement (through tax breaks) should be equally unacceptable.
 
b. Large Companies and Small Countries
 
In fact, the race to the bottom is part of the more general worry that critics
have when negotiations for investment occur between large companies and small
countries. It is assumed that this will lead to weak, poor countries yielding to
unreasonable demands from strong, large corporations negotiating to come in.
However, even weak countries can gain bargaining power by playing off one giant
corporation against another; and they do. Thus a small country like Poland has
recently chosen between Airbus and Boeing, both huge corporations and both in
continuous and ﬁerce competition that makes rip-offs of potential purchasers
highly improbable. Enron was accused of having taken India for a ride just a few
years ago, before the corporation self-destructed. But the problem was that India,
because it was in a rush to get energy investments going rapidly, had foolishly failed






There were accusations of bribery by opposition parties in India and by some journalists, but they
remained both implausible and unproven.
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In the end, the anti-corporations critics need to remember the chief lesson that
economists faced in the 1930s with John Kenneth Galbraith’s assertion that large
corporations meant that there was monopoly power, and with the development
of the new theories of imperfect competition among large ﬁrms, learnt: that the
key to whether such monopoly power existed was to be found in effective barriers
to entry, that contestable markets yielded ‘as if’ competition and little monopoly
proﬁts. Sheer size is misleading; giants also compete vigorously, cutting into
monopoly power effectively, both in economic and political space.
But problems will arise where governance is weak, if not bad, and one must
contend with the fact that rulers, politicians and bureaucrats may be bribed by
corporations with deep pockets into creating monopoly proﬁts at social expense
and accepting terms and conditions that are detrimental to the host country’s social
advantage while the monopoly gains (or spoils) are split between the multinationals
and the corrupted ofﬁcials of the host country. There is no reason, however, to think
that this ‘joint rip-off’ model is the typical one: after all, democracy, account-
ability and transparency are increasingly evident in poor countries as well, though
we still have some distance to go. That transparency on the terms negotiated for
entry by speciﬁc multinationals, and the enactment of the Code at the OECD
(thanks to efforts by the US which had pioneered such legislation for US ﬁrms)
to make bribes paid in host countries illegal, are the principal instruments to




Perhaps the greatest fear of the critics has been that multinationals intrude





example comes from South America though others can be cited. When Chile
elected Salvador Allende, who began a decisive shift to the left in his policies
towards foreign investment and economic policies in general, ITT drew a line in
the sand, with the active assistance of the CIA and Dr Kissinger whose Chilean
record of human rights abuses (or war crimes, as many contend today worldwide)
has come under revived scrutiny. ITT and Pepsi are known to have played a role





But the question for us is: are not such episodes much less likely, even highly
improbable, today? This would indeed appear to be the case. The reasons are
twofold. First, democracy has broken out in several underdeveloped countries,




For an early discussion of the political issue, see my 9th V. K. Ramswami Lecture, ‘International
Factor Movements and National Advantage’, delivered in New Delhi, 1979; reprinted as Chapter 1




, edited by Robert Feenstra (1983).
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permits diverse non-governmental groups, and individuals of conscience, to point
the accusing ﬁnger at offending corporations and governments. Second, the accus-
ing ﬁnger now has more salience in the age of television: Gorbachev uses troops
in the Balkans, the CNN carries the pictures, and his moral standing collapses
until he changes course and learns from his undoing.
These correctives seem to have diminished greatly the incidence of gross
meddling in domestic politics by foreign multinationals. The real danger today lies




 meddle in domestic politics. Some NGOs today seem to accuse multinationals
of neglect, rather than intervention, when it comes to advancing their own agendas.
 
d. Exploitation of Workers?
 
If any conviction strongly unites the critics of multinationals today, however,
it is that they exploit workers in poor countries. At ﬁrst ﬂush, this sounds very
strange since ﬁrms that create job opportunities should be applauded, no matter
that their motivation in investing abroad is to make proﬁts, not to do good. So,
why do the critics get excited? Much of their ire has been aroused by their
assumption that multinationals, so rich and with such deep pockets, pay such low
wages. Then there is also the related assertion, including by the leaders of the
anti-sweatshop movement on US campuses, that multinationals run sweatshops
in poor countries. This accusation need not be based on payment of ‘low’ or
‘inadequate’ wages but on two alternative criteria: either that the multinationals
violate explicit local laws on safety and other working conditions or that they do
not conform to customary international law as typiﬁed by norms established in
international conferences or through ILO conventions, for example.
That multinationals exploit workers in the poor countries by paying ‘low’ wages
is the least persuasive charge. In fact, it comes close to being both nonsensical and
contradicted by facts. The typical critique asserts that the output of the multina-
tional, say a Liz Claiborne jacket, sells for $194.00 presumably in Lord & Taylor
in Manhattan, New York, whereas the female worker abroad who sews it gets
only 84 cents: exploitation is then ‘obvious’. This precise estimate, and the infer-





 written in response to my defence of Nike in an op.ed. in the
same newspaper, of Dr Eileen Applebaum, who held a senior professional position





 But there is surely no necessary relationship between the price





See Bhagwati (2000a); Applebaum, Letter to the Editor (5 May, 2000); and my reply, Letter to
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Just for starters, for every jacket that succeeds, there are probably nine that do
not. So, the ‘effective’ price of the jacket one must consider is a tenth of the
successful jacket: only $19.00, not $194.00. Then again, owing to distribution costs,
and in the case of apparel also the tariff duties, for sure, the price of a jacket almost
doubles between landing in New York and ﬁnding its way to Lord & Taylor’s
display hangers.
But that is not all. The relationship between output prices and wages can be
anything, frankly, and may not reveal anything, generally speaking, of value.
Thus, consider the diamond polishing industry in the town of Surat, India, which
has witnessed rising prosperity ever since Surat has become a rival to Antwerp
in this business. If the ﬁnal price of the diamond in Paris is a million dollars,
even a wage payment of $10.00 an hour and a total wage payment to the worker
of $1,000.00 will appear minuscule as a fraction of the ﬁnal price. But so what?
A possible question of interest may be whether Nike and other multinationals
are earning huge monopoly proﬁts while paying their workers only a competitive
wage, and that these ﬁrms should share these ‘excess’ proﬁts with their workers.
But, as it happens, nearly all multinationals such as Liz Claiborne and Nike are
in ﬁercely competitive environments. A recent Templeton College, Oxford,
study of the proﬁts performance of 214 companies in the 1999 Fortune Global
500 list shows a rather sorry performance, about 8.3 per cent on foreign assets,
and even a decline to 6.6 per cent in 1998. Where is the beef that might be shared
with workers?
So, let me turn differently to the question of ‘low’ wages: are the multinationals




 what these workers get in alternative
occupations in what are really poor countries with low wages? This is virtually
implied by the critics. We must ask; is this really true? Or are the multinationals
actually paying higher wages than workers would get elsewhere, say from local




, even if ‘low’ (and reﬂective of the poverty in poor countries) according
to the critics, surely it seems odd to say that multinationals are exploiting the
workers they are hiring. Now, if there was slavery elsewhere and the workers
were being whipped daily, as the Romans did with the galley slaves, then the fact
that multinationals were whipping them only every other day would hardly turn
away the critics. But wages are another matter, obviously. So, what are the facts
on wage payments?
As it happens, several empirical studies do ﬁnd that multinationals pay what
economists now call a ‘wage premium’: they pay an average wage that exceeds
the going wage, mostly up to ten per cent and exceeding it in some cases, with
afﬁliates of US multinationals sometimes paying a premium that ranges from 40
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What about subcontracting by multinationals? There does not appear to be any
signiﬁcant evidence, when multinationals subcontract, that subcontractors pay
lower than the going wage in domestic ﬁrms and in alternative jobs. It is likely,
however, that the wages paid are closer to these alternatives; the wage premium
is possibly negligible, if it obtains at all, in subcontracted work.
In both cases, whether there is direct employment at a wage premium by the
multinationals or there is subcontracted employment at a negligible premium,
these are only direct or proximate effects. By adding to the demand for labour in
the host countries, multinationals are also overwhelmingly likely to improve wages
all around, thus improving the incomes of workers in these countries.
But if the wage argument against multinationals must be dismissed, there is still
the accusation that these corporations violate labour rights. Now, there are two




 are violated, on safety
and other working conditions. This is the conventional view of ‘sweatshops’, not
that they pay low wages (by which deﬁnition, since wages are necessarily low in
poor countries, one would reach the absurd conclusion that all production in
these countries is ‘sweatshop output’), but that they violate local laws whatever
they happen to be. There are serious difﬁculties with this critique, however.
First, it is highly unlikely that multinational ﬁrms would violate such laws and
it is hard to ﬁnd evidence that this is taking place in an egregious, even substantial,





 in Guatemala, mind you), when illegal immigrant labour and lack of enforce-
ment are the driving factors. I recall Secretary of Labour, Robert Reich, marching
with a hapless TV celebrity, Kathy Lee Gifford, caught in the cross-currents of
sweatshop accusation and denials, walking into the New York garment district to
exhort against the violations of US legislation on working conditions; and imagine
my surprise when I discovered that the entire United States had less than a dozen
inspectors to do the job.
These sweatshops are typically small-scale, not multinationals. If the sub-
contractors who supply parts to multinationals, for example, are small shops, it
is possible that they, like local entrepreneurs, violate legislation from time to
time. But that raises the question: since the problem lies with lack of effective
enforcement in the host country, do we hold multinationals accountable for any-
thing that they buy from these countries, even if it is not produced directly by
multinationals? But that is tantamount to saying that multinationals must effec-
tively boycott purchasing anything that is produced and sold by countries where
labour laws are not enforced, even when there is no formal boycott being
imposed by the international community through invoking Article 7 at the United
Nations, for example, or by the government of the country where the multinational
is headquartered! That seems to be incoherent.
Second, such a position is also undemocratic since lack of enforcement may
be explained by the fact that, in many poor countries, one encounters a bi-modal
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situation (i.e. there are two dominant practices) in regard to social legislation:
either there are no laws or there are many, and excessively generous ones. The
‘lack of enforcement’ critique applies naturally to the latter situation. But then
we must ask why the legislation is not enforced. The most likely reason is that
there was no intention to enforce it in the ﬁrst place. Often, extraordinarily
expensive provisions are mandated simply because enforcement is going to be
negligible. Thus, as the economist Henry Simon reminded us, progressive taxes
were enacted to please the Democrats; and the loopholes were put in to please
the Republicans. In the same spirit, countries like India have some of the most
progressive, and expensive, legislation on the books concerning even minimum
wages, but with no real intention to enforce it precisely because the cost of such
mandates would be forbidding. So, the generosity of these provisions in the face
of acutely limited resources is simply to feel good, that the legislators mean well
but beyond that, alas . . . ! In fact, the question one might well ask: why not then
offer yet more generous beneﬁts to the workers? I recall the Nobel laureate
Robert Solow, a famous wit, being told that Harvard’s highest salary was
$150,000.00 but that no one was being paid it, and then responding: in that case,
why not say that the highest salary was $250,000.00?
Indeed, often legislation may have also dated, and people may have changed
their minds about its advisability, but the political battle to drop or modify it
would be too expensive; so the legislation remains but no one seriously expects
it to kick in. Thus, New Hampshire reportedly still has anti-adultery statutes on
the books but they are dead like a skunk in deep snow.
But if multinationals are unlikely candidates for the accusation that they oper-
ate in signiﬁcant numbers and with substantial lapses in violation of local labour
laws on safety and working conditions, there always remains the almost impossible
criticism that, no matter what the host country or home country laws, a multi-
national can be found in violation of what is called ‘customary’ international law.
Except for off-the-charts behaviour such as employing slave labour or torturing
workers in their employ, the problem with this type of criticism is that it is
open-ended and becomes tantamount to harassment. In fact, I am of the view that,
while the ILO and several NGOs have been pushing for the violation of ‘core’ labour
standards as a violation of ‘customary’ international law, and this sounds reasonable,
it is fraught with the danger that these general principles inherently leave too
much ambiguity, opening the way for the persistent or powerful to harass corp-
orations and poor countries which badly need investment by these corporations.
Thus, take the issue of the ‘right to unionize’, a critical right even within the
‘core’ labour standards. But how is one to cope with the fact that this right has
several nuances and dimensions and that virtually all countries could be found in
violation of it in some way? Thus, central to this right is the ability to strike: a
union without an effective right to strike is a paper tiger. But, as a Human Rights
Watch report, which concluded that ‘millions of workers’ in the United States
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are denied the right to unionise, noted, the Taft-Hartley law’s provisions that allow
hiring of replacement workers and discourage sympathetic strikes have badly




 So, are all corporations in the
United States, which operate under this state-sanctioned violation of the most
basic right to unionise, to be hounded and chastised?
The same could be said about the issue of gender discrimination, yet another core
labour standard. There is no society today that is free from gender discrimination
of some form, indeed of any form arguably. So, how does a broad statement of
these ‘core’ rights, interpreted as ‘customary’ international law for the purpose
at hand really help?
My view is that we need to assert these broad aspirational objectives but that,
for purposes of assessing whether corporations in poor countries are to be con-





need to arrive at much narrower agreements on speciﬁc practices. For instance,
on the right to unionise, we could reach agreement today on outlawing the killing
of union leaders, but not on whether replacement workers can be hired, or ﬁring
of workers is allowed for economic or disciplinary reasons. Agreement could be
reached, I suspect, on minimum safety provisions (e.g. the issuance, and enforce-
ment of the use, of goggles by foundry workers working near blast furnaces)
though not on rich-country, OSHA standards that are very expensive for poor
countries. In short, just as there is virtual agreement that torture in the form of pulling
nails out is unacceptable, but there is almost none on whether torture through use
of isolation and signiﬁcant deprivation of sleep should be permissible, it should
be possible to ﬁnd areas of agreement on narrowly speciﬁc practices which may
be proscribed. We could then move on to bring in yet others. In short, start narrow
and go broad. If you start broad, and seek to use NGOs and courts to object to
narrowly speciﬁc practices, you are likely to create a world of subjective inter-
pretations and unpredictable outcomes which will do harm rather than good.
The argument that ‘customary’ international law, interpreted broadly, can be
used to say that multinationals are ‘exploiting’ workers in poor countries is
therefore ﬂawed, or at least open to serious criticism, except for very narrowly
speciﬁed practices such as the use of slave labour, practices which virtually all
nations condemn and many have outlawed. The anti-Nike and other campaigns,
alleging that they do not pay a ‘living wage’ or do not have OSHA standards in
their factories, are little more than assertions of what these speciﬁc critics would








The growing numbers of such lawsuits against US corporations in US courts by plaintiffs, mostly
workers, who were employed elsewhere than in the US, are being listed in worldmonitors.com
whose editor is Mina Samuels, whose own e-mail is mina@worldmonitors.com. I am indebted to
Elliot J. Schrage for providing this reference.
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are invoked. It is perfectly possible and proper for others, equally motivated to
do good, to say that these demands will harm rather than help workers in these
poor countries, by making the inward ﬂow of investment and jobs less likely by
raising the cost of production, while rewarding further workers who are lucky
enough to get jobs in foreign-owned corporations to begin with. If so, these critics
are themselves in unwitting violation of perhaps the most important ‘core’ value:
that globalisation, and multinationals, should help the working class, not harm it!
Economists have also tried to get at this question from another angle. They
have asked: is there evidence that multinationals are partial to investing in poor
countries which have poor protection of workers’ rights to unionise and to enjoy
a safe workplace? Consider ﬁrst, however, whether wages matter. Of course, one
needs to be careful and not just look at wages; they must be adjusted for
labour productivity differences; if they are not, higher wages may simply reﬂect
higher productivity and therefore not be a deterrent to inward investment. Studies
that do this, though they are not focused on poor countries but rather on invest-
ment ﬂows among rich countries or among different states within the United
States, show that (productivity-adjusted) wages do matter. But other evidence





But what about non-wage matters? Interestingly, cross-section analysis of the
outward investment by US corporations shows that the more ILO workers’ rights





 Of course, the United States has in truth a better record on workers’
rights, no matter how deﬁned, than China; but China has ratiﬁed more conven-
tions than the US because the US political and legal scene requires, whereas the
Chinese one does not, that ratiﬁcations lead to real obligations. So, ratiﬁcations
are not a good guide to what protection exists for workers in reality. Analysts at
the ILO have also found that higher unionisation rates are associated with higher
investment inﬂows, whereas fewer ‘episodes’ of repression of rights of collective




 In short, the cross-
section evidence, which is often evidence of association rather than of cause and
effect and must be taken as little more than indicative, suggests that multinationals
do not go streaking to where labour rights are ignored or ﬂouted. If true, this
suggests that the notion that multinationals, by moving to where workers’ rights
are violated, encourage their violation by the poor governments seeking to attract
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4. BAD DOMESTIC POLICIES AS A CAUSE OF HARMFUL EFFECTS
 
So, the conventional criticisms of multinationals as harmful agents to poor
countries and to their workers are not persuasive when confronted with the avail-
able evidence. But there are also conventional caveats about the possible harmful
consequences of multinationals which economists have warned against. But these
follow from the fact that domestic policies, which they could change, are the
source of the problem. Or, as the Oxford economist Ian Little has put it well, direct
foreign investment is as good or as bad as your own policies.
Perhaps the most interesting caveats, with empirical support, relate to the
inﬂow of multinationals in the presence of high tariffs and other trade barriers.
In fact, in most poor countries, in the earlier anti-globalisation era in the 1950s
and 1960s when outward integration was feared, multinationals were also dis-
couraged as part of what was called an ‘import substitution’ (IS) or ‘inward-looking’
approach to the world economy. But some countries actually used high trade
barriers as a way to get multinationals to come in and invest. The tactic was to
tell a multinational that was selling its products, say radios in your country: we
will no longer allow you to sell the radios here and you will have to set up
production facilities here to be able to sell your products. This tactic, used in the
context of the IS developmental strategy, came to be known as one that led to
‘tariff-jumping’ inward foreign investment by the multinationals.
The problem with this type of investment inﬂow was that it usually led to heavy
dependence on imports of components. Faced with this tactic, ﬁrms tried to get by
with as little production in the country and import of the rest from more efﬁcient
factories elsewhere. So, while a ﬁnished car could not be imported, the car manufac-
turing ﬁrm often found it possible to get away by importing nearly all of it and just
adding the chrome and bumper to it in an assembly plant in the country! So, the
industrial development became acutely ‘import-intensive’ in economists’ jargon: a
little value added would necessitate an enormous import burden. So, the multinationals
were often reduced to a battle with the governments: they wanted to assemble as much
as they could; the governments wanted to assemble as little as they could. The result-
ing acrimony in these IS-strategy economies, and the inefﬁciencies that follow, are





, of what happened when the American Motor Corporation (AMC)
went into China to produce Jeeps for the domestic market. The AMC just wanted
to position itself in the Chinese market with as much import of the knockdown
car as possible; the Chinese wanted full-blooded production in Beijing instead and,
to make matters worse, they wanted AMC to spend resources to adapt the Jeep
for the Chinese army’s use, a commercially uninteresting proposition for AMC.
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But, equally important, economists soon realised that this strategy was also likely
to reduce the social returns to the inward ﬂow of direct investment to the point where
it might actually immiserise, rather than enrich, a country. This is because the
increased import intensity of the process might well lead to losses from the deterio-
ration of the terms of trade since exports had to increase to pay for increased imports
and that could reduce earnings from exports; and these indirect or induced losses could
outweigh any direct gains from the inﬂow of investment. But the immiseration
could also arise since the investment-inducing ‘tariff jumping’ trade barriers impose




But where the ‘export promoting’ (EP) or outward-oriented trade strategy was
adopted, as indeed it was in the Far Eastern economies, the foreign ﬁrms came
to produce, not for the domestic market, but for world markets. Thus, just as such EP
strategy was favourable to growth, and the social returns from domestic investment





did not use inward foreign investment as a principal component of her overall
developmental strategy, following the Japanese model. But Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore certainly did. And so did China since her opening up to trade in the
1980s when the IS variety of Beijing Jeep investment was replaced by the enor-
mous EP type of investment in the four coastal provinces whose enormous export
success translated into China’s impressive transformation in the two decades since.
 
5. POWERFUL GOOD EFFECTS
 
But if the harmful effects can be removed by policy changes suggested by
experience and be replaced by good effects instead, economists can also note other
good effects that multinationals can bring in their wake. Perhaps the chief such good
effect is what economists call ‘spillovers’. Do domestic ﬁrms beneﬁt when multi-
nationals with better technology and management practices establish themselves
in an industry because they learn productivity-enhancing techniques from these ﬁrms,
for example? Different channels through which such diffusion may occur can be
identiﬁed. Thus, managers may learn by observing or hearing about better manage-
ment practices. Or they may learn them when employed by the multinationals, then
transferring them to local ﬁrms when they take jobs with them or start their own
domestic ﬁrms instead. Such diffusion may also happen with production workers who
learn better discipline, for example, when employed by the foreign ﬁrms and then take




There is a huge literature on the possibility of immiserising foreign investment, a possibility
noted by several authors including myself, but beautifully demonstrated by the economists Carlos
Diaz Alejandro and Richard Brecher in a classic article in the 
 






See again Balasubramanyam et al. (1996).
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That such diffusion occurs and therefore beneﬁts the local ﬁrms and hence the
host country has been the conventional view among economist students of
multinationals for some time. It owes partly to early studies which showed that
the growth rate of productivity in industries with a greater share of multinational
output was higher. Many studies supported this, even when the growth of pro-
ductivity in domestic ﬁrms was sharply isolated and only this was related to the




 In recent years, there has been a veritable
explosion of such studies. In particular, economists have probed the channels
through which the spillover effects could operate. Thus, Görg and Strobl (2005),
using ﬁrm-level data for a sample of manufacturing ﬁrms in Ghana, have
demonstrated that spillovers occur through movement of labour because workers
trained in multinationals move to local ﬁrms, often new start-ups, taking with them
the knowledge acquired when they worked for the foreign ﬁrm. Again, analysis
of electronics and engineering sectors in the United Kingdom has underlined





 There is also evidence, from the analysis of ﬁrm-level data in the United
Kingdom, that local ﬁrms may learn to export from multinationals, through infor-




While a few studies show zero spillovers, it is certainly possible that there may
even be harmful spillovers: local entrepreneurship, for example, may be destroyed
or inhibited. The fear that large multinationals would drive small local ﬁrms into
extinction and cripple domestic entrepreneurship is widespread among the critics
of multinationals. This is best reﬂected in the cartoon I once saw, of a tiny vendor
selling hot dogs under a giant skyscraper owned by a manufacturer of packaged
foods. But that cartoon also showed the weakness of the argument: the two
manage to co-exist perfectly well! In short, once differences in quality and in the
customers targeted are taken into account, there is room for big and small. The
fears are grossly overblown, to say the least; none of the econometric studies of
spillovers have turned up signiﬁcant evidence of harmful spillovers to date. (For
a comprehensive review of the evidence see Görg and Greenaway, 2004.)
 
6. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
 
If corporations help rather than harm poor countries and their workers, then




Several of these early studies, including the very ﬁrst by Jorge Katz which used Argentine data,









Greenaway et al. (2004).
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that is based on the conviction that the harm they do must be offset by the
assumption of compensatory social responsibility. It would appear, therefore, that
the true, indeed the only, compelling reason for corporations to assume social




the social good that their economic activities promote when they invest in these
developing countries, and for which there is now much evidence. Indeed, this act
of altruism is precisely what characterised many of the socially committed
families that made fortunes in trade and industry: the Dutch burghers (of Simon
Schama), the Jains of Gujarat in India, the Quakers (such as the Wilberforces that
led the ﬁght against slavery), the Jews (such as the Rothschilds). With the rise
of the corporations delinked from families, there is now a growing perception
that they too, and not just the ﬂoating crowd of shareholders in their personal
capacities, should commit themselves to such altruism, playing their role in adding
to the public good as each corporation best sees ﬁt.
In creating the architecture of corporate social responsibility, however, we must










 do. In fact, once this is recognised, it is apparent




Secretary-General Annan’s Global Compact at the United Nations ﬁrst proposed
by him in Davos three years ago, is what economists call a ‘social norming’
proposition. By signing on to it, corporations agree to uphold certain broad values
such as human rights, which of course include our rights as workers, as consumers,
as voters, as children and as women. The Compact has now been endorsed by
several leading NGOs such as Amnesty International, and by unions such as the
ICFTU as well. However, as it has no monitoring, certiﬁcation and enforcement
mechanism, it has been rejected by some unions and NGO activists. But they are
missing the point.
The very act of signing on to such a Compact focuses the signatory corporations,
as well as potential critics, on what they do and plan to do to achieve progress





 stated (such as the removal of gender discrimination and




 steps they take must surely be left to the corporations, working with the
democratic countries in which they operate.
For instance, signatory corporations operating in the United States – where, it
may be recalled, a recent Human Rights Watch report has found that ‘millions
of workers’ in nearly all industries are denied full freedom to associate and form
unions (largely but not exclusively because of restrictions that make it difﬁcult
 WHY MULTINATIONALS HELP REDUCE POVERTY 225
 
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007
 
to organise strikes effectively) – can be expected to follow national legislation
and act within their national rights. They would, for example, exercise their right
to hire replacement workers freely, even though that helps cripple the right to
strike. But they would be expected to reduce wage discrimination against women
within the same institutions of hire because the US accepts that objective explicitly
and enforces it.
The complexity of the issue is illustrated further by the fact that there are both
narrow and broad deﬁnitions of gender discrimination with regard to equal pay.
What US corporations do with regard to ensuring equal pay for women to ensure
conformity to ‘workers’ rights’ objectives will depend, therefore, on the prevalent
US legislation. Thus, what ‘socially responsible’ American corporations do in the
US may well differ from what Sweden or India accepts as a sensible way to
proceed, although all three nations accept the general concept of ‘granting the
freedom of association’ and ‘eliminating gender discrimination’.
Despite this inevitable, and indeed desirable, diversity of detail, the Compact
will help diffuse good practices in a ﬂexible fashion. Once corporations with
reputations to protect have signed on, they are in the public view. Pressure to make
some progress, no matter how diverse and situation-speciﬁc, will arise, leading the
corporations to move in one way or another towards the norms they have afﬁrmed.
The same can be said of a growing number of codes developed by industry
associations. They are critiqued as cop-outs, as ‘dodges’ designed to mislead and
misdirect critics by pretended action. But these criticisms seem to me to miss the





We now also have several ‘social accountability’ codes that are offered by
organisations that have been set up speciﬁcally to propagate corporate social
standards. Leading examples include the pioneer, the New York-based SA8000
(on whose board I have served), and the UK-based Ethical Trading Initiative, the
Washington-based FLA and others. Unlike the Global Compact, they involve speciﬁc
obligations and, equally important, monitoring prior to and after certiﬁcation.
Decertiﬁcation can also follow: SA8000 has been known to decertify factories.
These codes are voluntary; they can be ignored; but once signed on to, they entail
well-deﬁned obligations.
The proponents of each voluntary code would like to have their own as the
only one available. But this would be fundamentally wrong. The codes can and
do contain so many different requirements that diversity is desirable. In fact,
since virtually all codes currently available are from developed countries, I believe
it is essential that some be drafted by developing countries. That would bring
very different perspectives into the fray. For example, there is a great push for a
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living-wage requirement in nearly all of these codes. But this, according to many
intellectuals and NGOs in developing countries, is misguided since, as already
discussed earlier, multinationals typically pay a premium wage to their workers:
why raise that further by pretending that workers are being exploited because
they are not earning even more? A code that explicitly excludes a living-wage
requirement but includes other stipulations should also be available. But it will
likely not come from the developed world.
The element of choice and the need to keep developing country perspectives
in view are issues that have escaped the anti-sweatshop movement on US university
campuses. In fact, I believe that the currently available codes over-emphasise
developed country perspectives on issues such as workers’ rights and neglect
developing country perspectives. The codes reﬂect a certain degree of paternalism
as well as the deep inﬂuence of Western labour unions, whose own perspectives
are often coloured by the increasingly ﬁerce competition from poor countries.
These issues have surfaced in the context of the anti-sweatshop agitation on
American university campuses to deﬁne social responsibility by textile ﬁrms
abroad and to exclude campus contracts for supply of apparel etc. if these ﬁrms
do not sign on to speciﬁc codes. Several economists, organised under the Academic
Consortium of International Trade Scholars (ACIT) formed recently by myself
and others at Michigan University, joined the debate on these questions and had
some success in bringing them to the forefront. This was not done with a view
to rejecting the notion of social responsibility, but rather with a view to bringing




Complementing the Global Compact and voluntary codes is the suggestion of
national mandatory codes which would extend to operations abroad by a nation’s
multinationals the rules and regulations that deﬁne at home what the corporations
cannot do as good citizens.
These mandatory national codes will naturally vary across nations (because
different nations will have different ideas and laws concerning what is allowable
and what is not) whereas the voluntary codes are obviously uniform worldwide.
I suggested such a mandatory code for American ﬁrms operating in Mexico over




, in the context of the NAFTA debate: it





 In short, US ﬁrms must abide abroad by the basic principles that
are expected at home.
Thus, under this approach, if a US ﬁrm had been in South Africa when apart-








 (24 March, 1993).
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the same policy. Or if Mexico did not have legislation forbidding the dumping
of mercury into its waters, American ﬁrms would be expected by the US not to
take advantage of that. Yes, some American ﬁrms will move to the Bahamas to
escape these codes, but then, if they get into political trouble, the US marines or
US diplomatic muscle will not be available to help them either.
Such mandatory national codes can extend to more speciﬁc environmental and
‘decent-work’ (minimal safety and dignity) provisions. Empirical evidence strongly
suggests that many big ﬁrms, which account for the bulk of foreign investment
in developing countries, generally abide by such provisions anyway. Why not
then allay concerns over a race to the bottom and put some of these provisions
into the mandatory national codes?
Will these diverse mandatory codes imply that a universal mandatory code is
to be denied? On the contrary. As these national mandatory codes come into
play, the mere juxtaposition of good and bad practices will create pressures over
time for convergence to good practices, given civil society and democracy today.
The convergence to universal mandatory codes, as with the recent Tobacco
Treaty at the WHO, came after decades of national legislations where some
nations moved ahead of others, while the laggards caught up under the pressures





rather than ending, with uniform and universalist mandatory codes seems to be
unrealistic except for practices that are truly off the charts today, such as slavery
and forced labour.
A tapestry woven in three colours, one of social norming codes, another of a
multiplicity of voluntary codes, and a third of diverse mandatory national codes,
would then appear to deﬁne a nuanced and desirable approach to the question of
social responsibility by global corporations today. They would put multinationals,
unfairly accused of predation, into a yet better position as institutions that mightily
advance the economic and social good in the countries they invest in.
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